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The Rise and Fall of Training and Visit Extension:  
An Asian Mini-drama with an African Epilogue 
Abstract 
 
The paper reviews the origins and evolution of the Training and Visit (T&V) extension system, 
which was promoted by the World Bank in the period 1975-1998 in over 50 developing 
countries.  The discussion seeks to clarify the context within which the approach was 
implemented, and to analyze the causes for its lack of sustainability and its ultimate 
abandonment.  The paper identifies some of the challenges faced by the T&V approach as being 
typical of large public extension systems, where issues of scale, inadequate interaction with the 
agricultural research systems, inability to attribute benefits, weak accountability, and lack of 
political support tend to lead to incentive problems among staff and managers of extension, and 
limited budgetary resources.  The different incentives and outlook of domestic stakeholders and 
external donor agencies are reviewed as well. The main cause of the T&V system’s 
disappearance is attributed to the incompatibility of its high recurrent costs with the limited 
budgets available domestically, leading to fiscal unsustainability.  The paper concludes with 
some lessons that apply to donor-driven public extension initiatives, and more generally to rural 
development fads. The role of timely, independent, and rigorous evaluative studies is specifically 
highlighted.   3
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I.  Introduction  
 
  Within the voluminous literature on agricultural extension experiences, the emergence, 
widespread diffusion, and ultimate disappearance of the Training and Visit extension system has 
received much attention.  Various country-specific or generalized discussions were contributed 
over the years.  The purpose of this chapter is to pull together these insights and observations so 
as to provide an analytical narrative of the dramatic international rise and fall of T&V extension.  
To tell a coherent story requires utilizing a conceptual framework explaining the organizational 
behavior of public extension systems and the incentives of their staff and management, as well as 
the behavior and incentives of external donor agencies.  Thus, following the next section, which 
provides a general description of the pre-T&V extension scene, we sketch the general behavioral 
patterns underlying our discussion.  This is followed by a brief description of the principles of 
the T&V system and their rationale and merits, as well as their likely deficiencies.  The 
subsequent section of the chapter describes the evolution of the system in Asia and Africa (there 
was no significant presence of T&V extension in Latin America).  The final section provides 
concluding remarks that attempt to generalize the insights gained.  In view of the dominant role 
of the World Bank in the development and spread of T&V extension, there will be heavy 
reliance on the actions, studies and deliberations of the World Bank, although other sources are 
utilized. 
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interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors.  They do not 
necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World 
Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the 
governments they represent.   4
II.  Extension in the Post-Colonial Era 
 
  In the immediate aftermath of the dismantling of colonialism, agricultural extension 
organizations in developing countries followed generally the administrative structures of the 
colonial era (Axinn and Thorat, 1972).  The main focus was on supporting the production and 
marketing of export crops.  Gradually, the newly independent countries shifted more attention to 
food production, and their extension services evolved to serve a large clientele of smaller farmers 
rather than the export crop estates.  The production orientation of earlier years was often 
modified to include more general support to various aspects of farmers’ activities, such as 
community work, credit, input supplies, nutrition, family planning (e.g., Anderson and Hoff, 
1993).  A common perception among policymakers and agricultural officials in those times was 
that farm productivity growth was constrained by farmer backwardness, inadequate organization, 
and deficient local leadership.  Accordingly, in the 1950s and 1960s, extension agents operated 
within multipurpose development programs and village development initiatives.  In many 
instances, they were administratively assigned to local governments or to central ministries other 
than agriculture, or were accountable to more than one agency (Picciotto and Anderson, 1997). 
 
  The next section explains the factors underlying the observed performance of public 
extension and the political and bureaucratic environment in which they operated.  This will 
provide the background for the emergence of the T&V extension model, which aimed at 
overcoming some of the prevalent deficiencies.   5
III.  A Characterization of Extension Organization Behavior 
 
  Many scholars and observers of rural development commented on the frequent 
manifestations of unsatisfactory extension performance (e.g., Rivera, Qamar and Crowder, 
2001).  The common incidence of such performance issues across many developing countries is 
highlighted by Feder, Willett and Zijp (2001), who identified eight interrelated characteristics 
that are inherent in public extension systems, and which jointly lead to inadequate performance.  
These characteristics tend to be generic and could be applicable to any sector/subsector, but we 
highlight below why they have been more binding constraints in the case of the extension 
programs. 
 
1.  Scale and complexity:  The cost of reaching large, geographically dispersed and remote 
smallholder farmers is high, particularly given high levels of illiteracy, limited access to mass 
media, and high transport costs.  Farming systems often entail several crops, livestock, and even 
within given geographical area, there are variations in soil, elevation, microclimate and farmers’ 
capabilities and access to resources.  With such a large and diversified clientele, only a small 
fraction of farmers can be served directly (face-to-face) by extension, and agents tend to focus on 
the larger, better resourced and more innovative farmers.  This reduces the potential for farmer-
to-farmer diffusion.  Limited outreach to smallholder clientele reduces the benefits and impact of 
extension.   
 
2.  Dependence on broader policy environment:  The outcome of extension efforts 
depends on policies over which agents and their managers have little influence (input and output 
prices, credit policies, input supplies, marketing and infrastructure system).  The policy   6
environment can indeed affect any investment, but more so for extension programs, particularly 
if the advice is not adjusted to reflect the incentive environment in which farmers operate. 
 
3.  Interaction with knowledge generation: Public extension and research systems often 
compete for budget, but research institutions have an advantage due to their higher status, better 
management quality, and links with the global science community.  This creates tensions and 
militates against an effective two-way communication (e.g., Mureithi and Anderson, 2004).  The 
dependence of extension programs on science and technology (and generation thereof) and vice-
versa is strong, i.e., the linkage effect is more important than it is among other sub-sectors, and 
yet research scientists do not have strong incentives to interact with extension. 
 
4.  Difficulty in attributing impact: Attribution of impact is an analytically challenging 
task in the case of extension programs, due to the lack of baseline information, unavailability of 
appropriate control groups, and the systemic biases in extension placement and contacts 
(Birkhaeuser, Evenson and Feder, 1991).  Given the difficulty of attributing outcomes, managers 
focus on collecting the reporting input indicators (visits made, meetings and field days arranged, 
sample kits distributed), that are easier to assemble, and the incentives to deliver high-quality 
information service is weak (Martens et al., 2002, p. 20). 
 
5.  Weak accountability:  Weak accountability (linked to the inability to attribute impact) is 
reflected in low-quality and repetitive advice given to farmers, and in diminished effort to 
interact with farmers, and to learn from their experience.  There are no mechanisms, or   7
incentives to create mechanisms (e.g., participatory processes) for fostering accountability to 
clients who can best observe the quality and quantity of extension input. 
 
6.  Weak political commitment and support:  Feder, Willett and Zijp (2001) suggest that 
highly visible irrigation or road projects are more attractive to politicians than extension 
expenditures.  This, compounded by difficulties in attribution of impact, makes extension an easy 
target for lower budgetary support. 
 
7.  Public duties other than knowledge transfer:  Governments are often tempted to use 
field-level cadres of public servants who are already present in the countryside for non-extension 
duties such as collection of statistics, distribution of subsidized inputs, assisting and collecting 
loan applications, and election campaign work on behalf of local or national ruling parties. 
 
8.  Financial unsustainability:  This can cause the demise of any investment program but it 
is observed that at times of general fiscal constraints, extension budgets are more likely to be 
squeezed due to weak political support.  Due to the large share of staff costs in the recurrent 
costs, and the rigidity of public personnel policies, field operations (including maintenance of 
equipment and buildings, and training) provide the most flexible cost-cutting budget items. 
  While the discussion above provides rationale for the weak performance of extension, 
and the limited popularity of extension spending with national politicians and senior officials, 
one observes a much greater enthusiasm and support for funding extension among managers and 
staff in external donor agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  The NGOs 
typically operate at a small scale (tailored to the limited external budgets they can provide) and   8
their activities are on a full grant basis, not requiring local government funding.  They are 
therefore less concerned with issues of fiscal sustainability.  They overcome the various 
incentive problems by deploying external or local advisors who work closely with local 
extension at the field level, thus providing effective supervision.  And they often have access to 
better-quality, more committed field advisors, through the higher pay levels they provide.  Thus, 
NGO-supported extension initiatives often are perceived to (and may in fact) have better 
performance, but they cannot be realistically scaled up to national level with the same level of 
staffing and performance.  Small bilateral donors often operate in a similar mode to that of 
NGOs. 
 
  The incentives and explanations are different for large external donor agencies, which 
cannot have extensive field presence in the large extension projects they finance.    An 
explanation of their support for extension projects, focusing on extension systems at the national 
level (or large sub national units) is provided by Anderson and Feder (2004).  Often a small pilot 
or a small component within another project, with heavy supervision or other conducive 
circumstances (e.g., irrigation development, or delivery of abundant subsidized inputs, or simply 
the small and easily-managed scale) will create a perception (often justified) of success.  The 
extension model of the small-scale pilot will then be promoted to both the donor agency 
management and to developing-country policymakers as worthy of scaling up to the national 
level.  The traditional reluctance of national policymakers is temporarily overcome by the 
availability of abundant external funds that are provided outside of the normal budget 
framework.  Ministry of Finance officials, who normally are averse to the implied long-term 
liabilities entailed with expanding staff-intensive systems, do not know enough about agriculture   9
and extension, and may be impressed with the output growth projections based on extrapolations 
from the small-scale pilots.  Local extension and agricultural bureaucracies are supportive of the 
expansion as the external funding provides resources to improve their infrastructure, expand their 
organizations, and boost their status.  The implicit rivalry with the research system is often 
overcome when the foreign-financed program focuses on both research and extension, or 
apportions some external funding for research organization-executed activities within a national 
extension project. 
 
  From the perspective of a large external donor, the upscaling of a pilot extension model 
to the national level is relatively simple to design, involving only one counterpart agency (the 
Ministry of Agriculture, or a couple of specialized agencies within it), thus reducing bureaucratic 
complexity.  The activities funded within the project are well defined inputs:  construction and 
refurbishing of extension offices and staff housing, procurement of vehicles, motorcycles (even 
bicycles), training activities, funding of additional personnel, etc.  A national-scale project entails 
a large loan or grant, while the preparation cost to the donor is not proportionately as high due to 
the ability to extrapolate from the parameters derived from the pilot project.   The cost of project 
preparation per dollar granted or lent is thus not high.  Furthermore, repeated projects are easy to 
process.  Extension projects do not present a hurdle as they do not require a rigorous ex-ante 
cost-benefit analysis (which confronts hardware-type projects). Moreover, the difficulty of 
attributing impact implies that it will be almost impossible to establish a definite failure at the 
end of the implementation period.  Thus, the bureaucratic risk for the promoter of the project is 
only the possibility of flagrant non-implementation of the input side of the project (e.g., non-
filling of agreed staffing levels, or no construction of agreed structures, or curtailing of field   10
operations due to inadequate recurrent budget transfers from government).  These are relatively 
low risks during the external-funded phase of an extension program and, even if they materialize, 
the cause of the failure can be assigned to the government rather than to a faulty design concept 
or to insufficient verification of the availability of viable technology to disseminate. 
 
  There are, therefore, strong incentives for external donor staff to promote large extension 
programs, and the local lack of enthusiasm can be overcome temporarily, for a couple of project 
cycles (10-12 years).  Ultimately, senior donor officials expect extension activities to be 
absorbed in the normal budget process of the recipient country, as the external funding is viewed 
by them as a one-time investment cost.  But if the expanded extension system entails a much 
larger recurrent (as well as equipment replacement) cost than that which is normally politically 
supported, a moment of truth is eventually faced.  The local budgets will be drastically or 
gradually reduced, with a major negative impact to be observed in field operations (i.e., 
diminished interactions with farmers), as staff levels can only slowly be reduced.  Alternatively, 
extension staff will be diverted into other (non-extension) agricultural or community activities 
for which budgetary resources are available.  Extension size, or the volume of extension 
information dissemination activities, will thus converge to those dimensions that are compatible 
with political realities (e.g., Purcell and Anderson, 1997). 
 
  This projected scenario may span a somewhat longer time period in heavily donor-
dependent, very poor, countries.  The reason is that, in such countries, a significant proportion of 
government budget is derived from donor funding directly or indirectly, and recurrent costs are 
routinely funded (at least indirectly) to a significant extent by external donors.  The concept of   11
“mainstreaming” (i.e., absorbing into the normal budget process) of a larger extension 
organization is therefore less applicable, and senior donor management can be persuaded to 
support extension funding over a longer horizon.  Furthermore, local policymakers are more 
receptive to what is perceived as donors’ strong advice due to their dependence on external 
funding, thus misgivings about the priority given to extension are often not voiced too forcefully.  
One would thus expect that large donor-supported extension systems will tend to last longer in 
donor-dependent Africa than in Asia. 
 
IV.  The Advent of Training and Visit Extension 
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, technology diffusion became the key focus of 
agricultural extension systems.  The rationale for shift was eminently apparent:  new high 
yielding varieties for staple cereals were released by international research centers, and adapted 
by national research systems.  This coincided with higher output prices due to food scarcity 
making dissemination efforts likely to meet receptive farmers (Lipton with Longhurst, 1989).  
Yet, extension systems of the time were viewed as not very effective. 
 
  The concept of Training and Visit (T&V) extension was developed in the early 1970s, 
and implemented as a component in two regional irrigation projects, the Seyhan (Phase 2) 
project in Turkey, and the Chambal (Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh) project in India, both 
funded by the World Bank in 1974.  The principles of the system were spelled in great detail in 
Benor and Harrison (1977) and Benor and Baxter (1984), and are well familiar to most rural 
development scholars.  We recount them briefly with an interpretation demonstrating that they   12
were designed to overcome some of the inherent weaknesses of public extension systems 
outlined in Section III. 
 
(i)  A hierarchical organization with several layers of management overseeing a large cadre 
of village level workers under a single line of command, so that extension workers are not 
controlled by, or responsible to, other authorities (such as communal leadership or special crop-
oriented organizations).  The organization included subject matter specialists who were the 
technical resource staff.   
 
(ii)  A rigid bi-weekly schedule of visits to a defined fixed list of contact farmers (later 
modified to contact groups) in specific villages within a village worker’s area of responsibility.  
The contact farmers (or groups) were expected to disseminate information further to other 
farmers within the community. 
 
(iii)  Fortnightly regular training of village level workers, administered by superiors and 
subject matter specialists, and focused on the information to be delivered in the coming couple of 
weeks. 
 
(iv)  No involvement of the extension organization and its field level workers in non-extension 
duties, such as input distribution and loan applications.  Extension staff were to handle only 
agricultural information services. 
   13
(v)   Regular interactions (through seasonal workshops) of extension’s leaders and subject 
matter specialists with research station scientists.  Specialists were expected to conduct their own 
on-farm research. 
(vi)  Concentration on the most important crops, and on messages about relatively simple low-
cost improved practices. 
 
  The hierarchical structure, and the strict schedule of visits to predetermined contact 
farmers, whose names and time of visits were known to supervisors, was designed to overcome 
the weak incentives to interact with farmers on information delivery.  The single line of 
command and prohibition on non-extension duties was intended to overcome the temptation to 
assign (by higher level officials) and undertake (by extension workers) potentially remunerative 
duties not involving information dissemination.  Thus, the design improved the accountability of 
village-level workers to their superiors with respect to the quantity of their work, but not with 
respect to quality.  In the absence of accountability to farmers, quality and impact were still 
difficult to observe, although the frequent and mandatory training was intended to improve the 
overall knowledge of workers and overcome their disincentives to invest in improving their 
skills.  Feedback from farmers through village workers to supervisors and subject matter 
specialists was theoretically feasible during the training sessions.  But the incentives for staff to 
solicit such feedback and report it were not much changed, compared to the past, in the absence 
of accountability to farmers.  Some T&V projects (notably in India) had built-in units for 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) that were designed to provide management with feedback, 
both on the mechanics of the system (visits, training sessions), as well as on impact, but the 
typical skill profiles of those likely to serve in such units were not adequate to perform reliable   14
attribution analysis.  Furthermore, these M&E units were structured to be under the authority of 
extension management, so their independence was compromised.  As a result, the inability to 
attribute the extension system’s impact convincingly at the aggregate level, and thereby to gain 
the support of policymakers, was still a problem under the T&V design. 
 
  The pre-designed interaction with research, and the structured positions for subject-
matter specialists, whose mandate required regular contact with research, were to overcome the 
weakness in this field.  But the incentives for research scientists to invest heavily in interaction 
with extension have generally been slow to change if at all, so there were limits to the progress 
that could be achieved in this respect. 
 
  The large clientele was to be served by a larger field-level cadre than before.  This, as 
well as many other features of the design (multi-level hierarchy with more mid-level managers 
and technical experts, better mobility through vehicles and motorcycles, more local-level offices) 
implied not only a higher investment cost, but also a much higher recurrent cost compared to the 
pre-T&V situation.  This is reflected in the fact that 90 percent of completed T&V extension 
projects reviewed in Purcell and Anderson (1997) encountered serious recurrent cost funding 
shortages, some even while the project was still under implementation.  In our judgment this is 
the most crucial aspect responsible for the ultimate fall of the T&V extension model within a 25-
year period from its inception in 1974, rather than the fact that the design contained features that 
limited the improvement in effectiveness.  The promoters of T&V, while being aware of the cost, 
did not appreciate the political ramifications of high recurrent costs.  Thus, Development 
Communication Report (1978, p. 9) cited a key leader of the T&V concept in response to a   15
question on the high cost of the system: “cost is scarcely a consideration.  No country in the 
world can afford not to spend this money”.   
 
The deficiencies in effectiveness (in the many places where such was the situation) could 
not be easily detected and linked rigorously to poor outcomes at the farm level, and it is unlikely 
to have caused by itself a disenchantment with T&V by agricultural policymakers.  It is thus the 
higher cost, combined with the lack of convincing evidence of major gains attributable to 
extension, which most probably induced the fall of T&V. 
 
V.  The Spread and Decline of T&V Extension 
  
Following the formal introduction of T&V extension components in the Chambal Irrigation 
Command (Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh states in India) and the Seyhan Irrigation project in 
Turkey in 1974, World Bank staff associated with the projects provided enthusiastic feedback on 
the contribution of extension in these projects, and attributed significant on-farm gains to the 
extension reforms.  The on-farm changes in these project areas have never been analyzed 
rigorously.  It is quite likely that favorable farm performance was indeed observed in the project 
areas.  But it as likely that such improvements were due in some part to the better management 
of the irrigation services, more timely availability of inputs, and the close attention of World 
Bank staff in a relatively confined project area (Moore, 1984).  Furthermore, it is easier to 
manage a relatively small extension staff in an irrigation command area, operating within a fairly 
homogenous farming system.  But concerns regarding the legitimacy of extrapolating from these 
apparently successful smaller scale projects to the state or national level did not seem to have 
been raised forcefully.     16
 
Thus, the perceived success induced World Bank staff and management to actively 
promote the adoption of the T&V extension model in India and other countries even before the 
completion of the two irrigation projects.  This campaign, backed by readily available funding 
from the World Bank, was undertaken with such zeal and dedication that some observers likened 
it to the fervor of a religious movement (Moore, 1984, p. 307).  The spread of the new concept 
was dramatic:  By the end of 1982, the system was introduced in 13 states of India (with four 
more states in the next few years).  In the same period (1975-1982), T&V extension was 
introduced with World Bank funding in ten additional countries (mostly in Asia) through self-
standing extension projects, and in nine additional countries as components of larger agricultural 
projects in Asia and Africa.  Other donors, such as the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) and the FAO adopted the approach (or aspects of it) in their operations as 
well.  Later in the 1980s, additional countries adopted the approach, and many of the projects 
that were initiated in the 1970s and early 1980s were continued or expanded (with new funding 
from the World Bank) in second-phase operations.  Altogether, close to fifty developing 
countries utilized some form of T&V extension during the period 1974-1999.  However, as 
second-phase projects in India and other large Asian countries were being completed, in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, there were no new foreign-funded programs, as the external donors 
expected that these systems were already “mainstreamed”.  Thus, the extension systems had to 
be maintained through national or state budget only.  In Africa, however, there were still new or 
follow-up projects through the 1990s with the last one funded by the World Bank in 1998 in 
Cameroon. 
   17
It was inevitable that such a global effort attracted critical attention of development 
scholars and practitioners.  Critical comment focused on both systemic areas of weakness of 
public extension systems, as well as on features that were more specific to the T&V design and 
the manner in which it was implemented.  The earliest significant criticism is in the collection 
edited by Howell (1982a), which engendered a heated debate (Howell, 1982b), and was further 
elaborated by Howell (1983).  The next significant forum in which serious concerns regarding 
the effectiveness of the T&V model were prominently highlighted was a 1983 workshop in the 
National Institute for Rural Development in Hyderabad, India.  These concerns, pertaining to the 
experience in several Indian states, were summarized by Moore (1984).  Some of the problems 
related to aspects of T&V that could not be fully implemented.  Moore recounts reports of cases 
where the regular training sessions were not being held, or lacked real content; officers appointed 
as subject matter specialists without having adequate qualifications; linkages with research not 
quite enhanced; village agents not following the regular visit schedule, or contact farmers not 
attending visits, with some of them not being aware that they were designated as contact farmers.  
The common preference of agents to interact with larger scale and richer farmers was said to still 
be present under the T&V system.  And insufficient attention to the supply conditions of inputs 
hampered the relevance of the information conveyed to farmers.  According to Moore (1984), the 
supervisory staff did not have incentives to use the strict visit schedule as a device to enforce 
work delivery by village workers, and at a more senior level, the interest in the T&V program 
was not genuine, reflecting merely the desire to obtain the enhanced resources (e.g., vehicles, 
offices) associated with the projects.  The high cost of the system was Moore’s key critical point. 
   18
  Criticism and debates of this nature would have had a more decisive impact in forcing 
greater selectivity and flexibility in the global introduction and implementation of T&V in the 
1980s had they been backed by systemic data sets confirming the checkered adherence to T&V 
design principles, and a larger number of rigorous impact studies assessing the farm-level results 
of the program.  But extensive data on the mechanics of T&V in India were only available from 
the extension M&E units, and these indicated reasonable (albeit far from perfect) adherence to 
visit and training frequencies and contact farmer familiarity with their roles (Feder et al., 1986, 
Feder and Slade, 1986a, Slade et al., 1998).  It was argued by some observers (e.g., Moore 
(1984), Chambers (1992)) that the M&E units’ reports were likely distorted to present a 
favorable picture, but the extent of the bias was difficult to establish.  An independent data set 
from one district in Haryana demonstrated, for that particular area, that the mechanics of 
extension operations were reasonably in place (Feder and Slade, 1986b).  A subsequent critical 
report by Axinn (1988) reiterated some of the points raised by Moore (1984), based on extensive 
field visits, but rigorous impact studies were not available for quite some time.  One such study, 
from one district in Haryana, indicated (under the strong assumption that benefits observed in the 
first three years of the project will continue in future years, although at a declining rate) that the 
incremental cost of T&V in that district was justified, as there was a high likelihood of a viable 
rate of return (Feder, Lau, and Slade, 1987).  But there were no other rigorous impact studies 
until the 1994, when Hussain, Byerlee and Heisey found no T&V impact in Pakistan.  A 1993 
study by Bindlish and Evenson reported large returns for T&V extension in Kenya, but it was 
contradicted by Gautam (2000), who pointed out some data deficiencies in the earlier study, and 
demonstrated, using better data, that the impact in Kenya was insignificant.  These studies have 
not played much of a role in the apparent lack of support in Asian countries for sustaining T&V   19
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  These countries (such as India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Pakistan), have reduced the extent of their T&V extension operation over a relatively short span 
of time, both by not replacing retirements and transfers, by adding other duties or reassigning 
staff to other roles, and by abandoning key aspects of the T&V concept (e.g., the strict schedule 
of visits and trainings, and the uniform ratios of field and supervisory ranks). 
 
  The rearguard battle of the T&V extension concept was fought out in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, with the promoters facing increasing doubts and criticisms not only from rural 
development scholars and officials in developing countries, but also from within the World Bank 
itself.  As early as 1985, the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department expressed some 
criticism (albeit muffled) of the wholesale application of large-scale extension projects in 
situations that may not have warranted such systems (OED, 1985).  The internal debate 
intensified in the late 1980s and early 1990s as it became apparent that Asian countries, and in 
particular India, are gradually withdrawing from the T&V model due to the high cost.  This 
debate is evident in a World Bank 1989 edited volume on extension in Africa (Roberts, 1989), 
where several papers raise critical issues pertaining to the T&V approach’s design and cost.  The 
editor, in one of the papers, noted that promotion of the approach universally with little 
sensitivity to needs in particular situations and countries is attributable in part to the over-
enthusiasm and inexperience of World Bank staff impressed by the initial favorable feedback 
from Asia.  Thus the author conceded that, in the design of some African T&V projects, there 
have been instances of unnecessary rigidity (Roberts, 1989, p. 23).  The paper also recognized 
that T&V designers had not done justice to the issues of true farmer participation and to the 
financing of the high recurrent costs.   20
 
However, a 1990 report outlining lessons and suggestions for extension strategies (World Bank, 
1990) refrained from explicit criticism (earlier drafts were more critical) and highlighted the 
greater flexibility and adaptability of the T&V design as applied in recent projects.  Flexibility 
was indeed forced by reality on the originally rather rigid camp of T&V extension promoters.  
Examples of modifications in the design were cited by a number of observers: Roberts (1989) 
pointed out that in Sudan extension agents continued also their duties as supervisors for the 
irrigation system.  Similarly, in the Comoros extension agents handled input supply functions as 
there was no reliable private supply system.  The involvement of extension staff in non-extension 
duties was generally frowned upon by T&V designers.  Similar deviations from the exclusive 
devotion to extension are mentioned by Bagchee (1994).  The latter author also pointed out 
reduction in the frequency of staff training sessions in Kenya, Tanzania and Zaire, and higher 
ratios of farmers to agents in many countries compared to the standard 1 per 800 favored by 
T&V designers.  Increased use of mass media as a complementary channel of technology 
diffusion, along with the T&V effort, took place in Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and 
other countries.  The original T&V concept underplayed the reliance on mass media.  A fairly 
common adaptation in African T&V countries was the shift away from “contact farmers” to 
“contact groups” as the foci for interactions between agents and the farming clientele (World 
Bank 1990, p. 21; Bagchee, 1994).  This was designed to increase the number of farmers 
receiving face-to-face service from extension in view of the limited diffusion from contact 
farmers. 
   21
The modifications did not, however, tackle significantly a key source of the problems, namely, 
the staff-intensive high recurrent cost structure.  High-cost issues were indeed highlighted in 
Bagchee (1994, e.g., p. 19).  The conclusion was, however, only to exercise caution in expanding 
systems.  By the time an influential World Bank Operations Evaluation Study was published 
(Purcell and Anderson, 1997), it was apparent that fiscal issues were the key challenge, and the 
various modifications in design offered (and experimented with) in the World Bank’s African 
T&V extension projects were not sufficient to reduce the costs, as they came after the extension 
systems were already enhanced and expanded significantly.  The flexibility in retrenching public 
sector employees was limited and thus staff costs could not be changed much.  The 1997 OED 
report listed a number of frequently occurring difficulties in T&V extension projects and 
suggested that the relatively high (70%) share of projects graded “satisfactory” was probably not 
a realistic reflection of the actual rate of success due to the imprecise nature of such summary 
judgments.  The study concluded that “the Bank had erred in the extent to which it has promoted 
the T&V extension management system in relatively uniform packages of investments and 
extension practices in large state and national programs”.  The authors further concluded that the 
increased flexibility in African T&V projects was not likely to resolve the problems encountered 
and therefore the T&V design was “unlikely to be the most appropriate approach for improving 
extension in many African countries” (p. 98). 
 
  The 1990s witnessed greater interest in alternative extension concepts, with stronger 
participatory aspects, greater pluralism, and smaller public organizations.  In Africa, in 
particular, there was donor pressure to transfer some aspects of extension to private or other non-
government providers (Gemo, Eicher and Teclemariam, 2005).  Senior management was not   22
inclined anymore to expend political capital in convincing reluctant leaders in client countries to 
accept a high-cost extension model for which there was no rigorous evidence of widespread 
success at the farm level.  Furthermore, with a significant camp of critics inside and outside the 
Bank becoming increasingly vociferous in challenging the validity of the concepts and their 
universal feasibility, there were great risks in pushing further the T&V concept.  It was thus in 
Africa that the T&V extension model breathed its last, ending 25 years in which agricultural 
extension received the highest level of attention it ever attracted on the rural development 
agenda. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
As in most fields of human endeavor, fads are a fact of life.  Development practitioners 
need to be aware that they are not immune from this aspect of the human condition and thus need 
to guard against falling ready victims to what may appear as a new and relevant approach to an 
old problem.  A usually good starting point to assessing the new ideas is to check back:  on the 
principles underlying them; on the experience in implementation; and on the lessons learned, 
from the past fads that were followed.  Our discussion of the experiences, largely connected to 
World Bank operations, with the T&V approach to extension from birth to death, has been 
intended to facilitate such checking back.  Several insights emerge from these reviews, which 
have a bearing on other current or future extension concepts, and more generally on rural 
development initiatives. 
 
  The T&V approach tackled some, but not all, of the generic problems that hamper large 
public extension systems. In particular, the high recurrent costs continued to be an issue, just as   23
they were in earlier large extension systems.  Approaches that have a better chance of being 
successful are those that highlight the intended beneficiaries as empowered clients with their 
needs and demands articulated through service arrangements that heed them, and do so in 
organizational structures that are affordable within the political and fiscal environment of the 
country.  Such arrangements work best when the empowerment is driven by personal client 
stakeholding in the delivery of the services being sought, as the client is best positioned to 
observe the utility of the services rendered (see discussion in Feder, Willett, and Zijp, 2001). 
 
  The T&V extension experience also demonstrates the importance of timely and careful 
evaluation of pilot experiments with realistic assessment of the likely challenges to be faced if 
seemingly promising innovations are scaled up significantly.  Of particular importance in this 
context is an analysis of the fiscal implications of the expanded scale, the degree of dependence 
on external funding, and the likelihood of domestic support to the recurrent costs of the expanded 
program over time.  The often observed inadequacy of operations and maintenance funds in 
infrastructure projects suggests that this is a common issue, not specific to extension. 
 
  Once innovative designs are implemented on a large scale, evaluative studies in a 
reasonable number of differing locations are crucial in order to form reliable (preferably 
statistically valid) and convincing judgments on the applicability and limitations of the idea 
being promoted in different social, economic, political, and physical environments.  The 
availability of appropriate baselines and control groups is often essential for reliable evaluation, 
but these require prior planning, because their absence is difficult to rectify ex-post. 
   24
  Evaluation studies need to be independent of those who have a direct stake in the success 
of the endeavor, with evaluation teams in which there are no preconceived positions on the 
innovation being reviewed.  While most sponsors of evaluative studies are aware of the need for 
evaluators’ independence, one encounters too often evaluation teams purposefully selected by 
the concerned stakeholders so as to include scholars who have already expressed themselves 
favorably on the idea being studied, and this can compromise objectivity.  In situations where 
attribution of impact is analytically difficult, a full evaluation will require quantitative work by 
qualified professionals to complement qualitative assessments.  In many cases such econometric 
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